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London-listed company Soco and its contractors 
have made illicit payments, appear to have paid off 
armed rebels and benefited from fear and violence 
fostered by government security forces in eastern 
Congo, as they sought access to Africa’s oldest 
national park for oil exploration.
Material gathered as part of an undercover 
investigation by UK film-makers and reviewed by 
Global Witness, lays bare the extent of the acts 
carried out by Soco International plc – one of the 
UK’s 200 largest companies – and its supporters to 
further its oil project in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo’s Virunga National Park, which is a 
world heritage site.1 Only some of the undercover 
footage was included in a new documentary called 
“Virunga”. Soco has said in a public statement that 
it “does not condone, partake in or tolerate corrupt 
or illegal activity whatsoever.”2 
Soco has yet to find oil in the park. Following 
sustained pressure from campaigners, it pledged 
on 11 June that, after completing seismic testing, 
it would not “undertake or commission any 
exploratory or other drilling within Virunga 
National Park unless Unesco and the DRC 
government agree that such activities are not 
incompatible with its World Heritage status”. The 
ambiguity of Soco’s position leaves the door open 
to the park being fully or partly declassified for oil. 
This was underlined by a report in the Times on the 
day of the announcement, where Soco Deputy CEO 
Roger Cagle said Congo and Unesco could agree to 
redraw Virunga’s boundaries.3 
The video and audio recordings were collected by a 
court-appointed investigator, community activists 
and French freelance journalist Mélanie Gouby. 
The footage shows a Soco ally trying to bribe a 
senior park ranger to spy on the head of Virunga, 
local Soco agents handing out envelopes of cash 
to villagers to hold a demonstration, and a top 
Congolese parks official telling rangers they “will be 
paid money, money, money” if they collaborate with 
the company. Soco officials, meanwhile, labelled 
the head of the park, Emmanuel de Merode, as their 
major obstacle in secret recordings, and denigrated 
the park. Its operations supervisor in Congo said the 
world heritage site was “just a fucking mine”.
Activists and park rangers in Nyakakoma have been 
arrested, and in some cases beaten or stabbed, by 
soldiers and intelligence agents after criticising or 
obstructing Soco’s operations. Several of these cases 
have recently been documented independently 
by Human Rights Watch, which has called on 
Congolese authorities “to make sure that people 
are safe when they try to uphold the law, protect 
the park, and peacefully express their views”. 



























DRILLERS IN THE MIST: HOW SECRET PAYMENTS AND  
A CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE HELPED SOCO INTERNATIONAL 
OPEN AFRICA’S OLDEST NATIONAL PARK TO OIL
• Opponents of London-listed Soco International in Congo arrested, beaten  
and stabbed by government security forces identified as supporting the company
• Military intelligence officer working alongside Soco offered bribes to park 
ranger to spy on head of Virunga National Park, home to the world’s last 
mountain gorillas
• Soco made payments to Congolese MP to lobby for access to Virunga under  
a murky ‘consultancy’ arrangement
• Armed rebels appear to have received cash from company ‘subcontractors’
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VIRUNGA – A WORLD 
HERITAGE SITE IN DANGER
 
Virunga National Park, which lies on the equator in 
eastern Congo, covers an area almost three times 
the size of Luxembourg. It contains savannah, 
rainforest, lava-spewing volcanoes and most of 
one of Africa’s great lakes. Lake Edward’s fish 
support more than 30,000 people but the park’s 
most famous residents are some 220 critically 
endangered mountain gorillas – a quarter of 
the total global population.4 As a world heritage 
site, Virunga officially enjoys the same level of 
protection as the Yellowstone National Park and the 
Great Barrier Reef. 
But as easier-to-tap oil supplies have dwindled, 
the push into more remote areas has brought two 
European oil firms to Virunga. The French giant 
Total and London Stock Exchange-listed Soco 
International have been granted oil exploration 
rights to vast areas that overlap the park. To head 
off criticism, Total announced in 2013 that it 
would not explore for oil inside Virunga’s current 
boundaries even if these were to be moved.5 
Faced with opposition from western governments, 
UN agencies and conservationists, Soco made a 
commitment in June – in a joint-statement with 
the WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature) – which 
falls far short of Total’s unequivocal stance. 
That announcement on 11 June was the result of a 
mediation process stemming from WWF’s complaint 
against Soco to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). In addition 
to its pledge not to start new oil activities inside 
Virunga without agreement between Unesco 
and the Congolese government, the company 
committed not to operate in “any other world 
heritage site”.6 
detailed by Human Rights Watch and that its initial 
investigations “have not found the allegations 
raised to be substantiated or justified”.
In one exchange recorded by Gouby, a Soco official 
and contractor appear to admit the company has paid 
money to Congolese rebels. Brutal rebel groups have 
terrorised civilians and engaged in elephant poaching 
and illegal charcoal trading in Virunga. The dangers 
run by rangers seeking to protect the park were 
starkly illustrated by the attempted assassination  
of de Merode in April 2014 by unknown gunmen. 
The company also made monthly payments to an 
influential MP in the region – an arrangement that 
merits further investigation for possible violations 
of bribery laws. The MP – now a government 
minister – said that he was “compensated” by Soco 
for his work and described himself as a consultant 
to the company. He represented an area including 
the town of Nyakakoma, where Soco has its 
Congolese base camp. 
GLOBAL WITNESS IS CALLING ON:
• Soco International to launch a full, 
independent investigation and commit 
not to explore within the current 
boundaries of Virunga; 
• Soco to also publish documents related 
to its Virunga project, including a 
secretive 2011 agreement with the 
national parks authority, following 
which the authority reversed its 
opposition to Soco entering the park; 
• Investors to pressure Soco to commit 
to no oil activity within the current 
boundaries of Virunga, launch a full 
independent investigation and publish 
all relevant documents;
• UK and US anti-corruption authorities 
to examine the evidence of bribery, and 
determine whether the company has 
acted illegally.
Soco said in a statement to Global Witness that 
it “operates in accordance with the UK Bribery 
Act 2010 and any allegation to the contrary is 
categorically denied”. It said the Virunga film 
“contains multiple inaccuracies and many entirely 
false statements concerning the company’s 
operations”. Soco would “investigate thoroughly 
and deal with each and every incident” if there was 
evidence of wrongdoing, it added.
5Drillers in the mist | September 2014
Executive Roger Cagle has indicated his support for 
such an arrangement, telling the Times newspaper 
that the agreement “forces DRC and Unesco to 
come to some kind of accommodation”. 
Soco has also been at pains to tell investors and 
the Congolese authorities that its agreement with 
WWF did not signal the company was withdrawing 
from Virunga. For example, Soco’s Congo country 
WWF, meanwhile, has agreed to stop pursuing its 
OECD complaint and has declared “victory for our 
planet and for good practices in business”.7 
The deal, however, allowed Soco to complete a 
seismic survey inside Virunga to gather data on the 
park’s oil potential. Virunga could still be drilled 
under the agreement if the park is declassified or its 
boundaries are shifted. Indeed, Soco’s Deputy Chief 
SOCO’S PAST: CORRUPTION CLAIMS 
AND THE AXIS OF EVIL
Soco was registered in the UK in 1997, when 
Texan oil-man Ed Story brought in an old 
business partner, Roger Cagle, to help float the 
company on the London Stock Exchange.9 
The company has often gone where others fear 
to tread. Outside central Africa, it has operated at 
the frontier of the oil sector in countries including 
Libya, North Korea and Vietnam.10 “We didn’t 
concentrate on the Axis of Evil,” Story told a British 
newspaper in 2008. “It just worked out that way 
for a while. We go to a lot of strange places. We 
like to be there first and define the terms rather 
than take someone else’s.”11 
In 1999, two years after the float, a group of 
investors took a 25% stake in the company and 
joined the board.12 Patrick Maugein, a friend of 
former French President Jacques Chirac, became 
Soco’s chairman, and Rui de Sousa, a Portuguese 
oil trader, a director.13 Maugein and de Sousa – 
who became Chairman after the former’s death 
in 2006 – helped orientate Soco towards oil 
fields in French-speaking Africa.14 When Soco set 
up its Africa office, Maugein brought in another 
Frenchman to head up its operations – Serge 
Lescaut, who worked in oil in Iraq from 1998 to 
2003.15 
After buying into Soco, Maugein and de Sousa 
became embroiled in corruption allegations 
surrounding Iraq’s UN-supervised “oil-for-food” 
programme, which was intended to alleviate the 
effects of sanctions on Iraqi civilians but was used 
as a cash cow by Saddam Hussein’s regime. Both 
men were reported to have been given lucrative 
oil allocations by Iraq. De Sousa was linked by 
an official inquiry and an investigative report 
in the Wall Street Journal to the smuggling of 
over 400,000 barrels of oil out of Iraq in 2001 in 
contravention of UN sanctions.16 The authoritative 
Volcker report on the scandal said that Saddam’s 
government illegally earned €9.4 million from the 
scheme.
Maugein told the Wall Street Journal at the 
time that his dealings in Iraq “were conducted 
in a perfectly legal manner “. De Sousa said that 
he simply “went [to Iraq] to discuss potential 
investments” and that the corruption scandal 
was “a big hypocrisy”.17
Similarly, Soco’s first acquisition in central Africa 
in 2005 – the offshore Marine XI block in Congo 
Brazzaville – was mired in controversy. A private 
company Africa Oil and Gas Corporation (AOGC) 
was awarded a 10% stake as part of the deal. A 
UK court found that AOGC was secretly set up by 
a presidential advisor, who as head of the state 
oil company was in charge of overseeing the 
bidding process for the block.18 Maugein and de 
Sousa also held a stake in the block through an 
offshore company.19
These allegations against Soco board members 
have not prevented the company from receiving 
accolades in the business press. The Times said in 
September 2013 that its shares are “a good long-
term punt”, while more recently investment banks 
BMO Capital Markets and RBC Capital gave it an 
“outperform” rating.20
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year before, the company’s oil rights for Block 5 
were ratified by Congo’s President.21 Now Congo’s 
environment ministry had suspended its plans to 
begin exploration and national park authorities 
were arguing that oil exploration was illegal (see 
box: The legality of oil exploration in Virunga). Over 
half of Block 5 lies within Virunga.
In February that year a run-in with Virunga’s 
rangers entrenched these divisions. According to 
the General Manager of the Congolese national 
parks authority (the ICCN) a team of Soco officials 
accompanied by a local MP and 12 soldiers “forced” 
their way into the park, despite being forbidden 
entry by rangers guarding a barrier.22 It was the 
latest in a series of disputes with park authorities, 
who allege Soco had repeatedly entered the park 
illegally and offered bribes to a park ranger.23
Cosma Wilungula, the ICCN’s General Manager, 
made a formal complaint to the local public 
prosecutor, calling for a “preventative measure 
forbidding Soco personnel access to the park”. 24  
He said that exploring for oil in the park was illegal 
under Congolese law and violated international 
accords that Congo had signed.
Soco acknowledged that it had entered the 
park accompanied by the MP but argued that 
chief José Sangwa wrote to Prime Minister Augustin 
Matata Ponyo on 11 June 2014 that news of our 
“disengagement from oil exploration activities 
in Virunga National Park… is inaccurate”. Soco 
would process its oil exploration data by mid-
2015, he said, and that would allow the Congolese 
authorities to decide on whether to push ahead 
with oil operations or not.
Beyond the looming threat to Virunga, major 
questions remain about how Soco opened up 
Virunga to oil exploration and countered opposition 
with the help of some dubious allies.
A deal to unlock the park
Soco was set up and is still led by Ed Story, a 70-year-
old Texan oil man with a penchant for playing 
elephant polo. From small beginnings in 1991, as an 
offshoot of Fort Worth-based Snyder Oil Corporation, 
it has grown to be one of the 200 largest British 
public companies, with annual revenues of over 
$600 million.8 Along the way, company officers have 
courted controversy for links to corruption and Soco 
has been criticised for its focus on some of the world’s 
most dictatorial regimes (see box: Soco’s past).
In early 2011, the company’s bid to find oil in 
eastern Congo seemed to be falling apart. The 
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Soco later said it gave them the right to enter 
Virunga “for the purposes of carrying out scientific 
studies” in return for a fee to the ICCN “to monitor 
our activities… and contribute towards the cost of 
providing rangers”.31 It is not known how much Soco 
paid under the agreement.32 
A later 2013 deal between the two commits Soco  
to pay $180,000 a year, as well as a one-off 
payment of $150,000 for development projects  
to the parks authority.33
In the year after the May 2011 Soco-ICCN 
agreement, relations improved and by April 2012 
the ICCN’s Wilungula wrote to Soco saying the ICCN 
will “ensure that you and your teams… can enter 
Virunga National Park for all useful purposes”.34 He 
said the ICCN “supports wholeheartedly” Soco’s aim 
of “reconciling the conservation of the unique and 
irreplaceable biodiversity of [Virunga]… with oil 
exploration”.35 
The environment minister Endundo granted Soco 
a permit for aerial surveys over its block36 but 
resisted pressure from the oil ministry to give more 
far-reaching rights.37 In March 2012 he removed a 
key Soco ally from a committee monitoring the oil 
issue.38 Endundo lost his ministerial position later 
it had permission, saying Wilungula’s version 
was “blatantly false” and that it was in the park 
conducting an environmental assessment.25 
To make matters worse for the company, in March 
2011 Congo’s Environment Minister, José Endundo, 
rejected the environmental assessment by Soco as 
“premature” and “superficial”.26 He said a further 
assessment was needed before oil exploration could 
proceed.
In a letter to the Prime Minister that month 
Endundo joined the ICCN in accusing Soco of 
forcing its way into the park. He said that Soco’s oil 
contract “posed a problem” and that “any violation 
of the integrity of Virunga National Park… would 
lead to the decline not only of this park” but also 
of Congo’s four other national parks recognised as 
world heritage sites.27 He said this was not solely 
the position of the environment ministry but was 
the “clear and unambiguous position of the  
relevant texts”. 
Then, in May 2011,28 Soco signed an agreement with 
the ICCN.29 The existence of the deal was kept secret 
at the time, even from the Virunga authorities – 
based in the park at Rumangabo, 900 miles east of 
the ICCN’s Kinshasa headquarters.30
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mountain gorillas.40 The former director, Honoré 
Mashagiro, was later released for lack of evidence 
but the events surrounding his arrest marked one  
of the lowest points in the park’s history.
Under de Merode’s leadership, the park has bounced 
back from years of neglect. A hydro-electric plant 
has been built for local people and tourists have 
started visiting the mountain gorillas again, earning 
revenues of over $1 million in 2010 and 2011 
combined.41 The turbulent history of the area, still 
dotted with rebel groups, makes the rangers’ jobs 
dangerous and sometimes deadly: 130 park rangers 
have been killed in the park since 1996.42
Despite the about-turn of the national parks 
authority and the environment ministry in Kinshasa, 
Soco still had to contend with opposition in and 
around Virunga - from the park’s management under 
de Merode, as well as from activists and fishermen.
that month – it is not known whether it was in 
connection with his stance on Virunga. 
The agreement with Soco led to a split in the 
national parks authority between those willing to 
collaborate and those determined to shield Virunga 
from oil exploration. De Merode and his team in 
Rumangabo were left isolated.
De Merode, a 44-year-old Belgian conservationist 
who grew up in Kenya and the UK, was brought in 
by the Congolese government to manage Virunga’s 
team of about 300 ICCN park rangers in 2008.39  
He also sits on the board of the Virunga Foundation, 
which has a ten-year contract to manage the 
park alongside the ICCN. His appointment allowed 
Virunga National Park to restore its reputation 
following an international scandal that saw its 
previous director charged with complicity in the 
illegal charcoal trade and the killings of several 
THE LEGALITY OF OIL  
EXPLORATION IN VIRUNGA
Oil exploration or production in Virunga National 
Park is illegal under Congo’s 2011 Environment 
Law and its 1969 Nature Conservation Law, which 
says that land in national parks, “cannot be 
transferred or placed under concessions”.43 
A new Nature Conservation Law superseded the 
1969 text in February 2014. It declares “null any 
right granted within the boundaries of protected 
areas”.44 However, the law says “scientific 
research” and activities in the “public interest” 
may be permitted by a decree from the Council 
of Ministers where the activity is not detrimental 
to flora and fauna.45 Soco has not received 
such a decree. Although Soco has received 
presidential and ministerial decrees authorising 
them to explore for oil, these are of lower legal 
value than Congolese law. 
In addition, Virunga is protected as a world 
heritage site and the committee that governs 
these sites has stressed “the incompatibility of 
petroleum exploration and exploitation with 
World Heritage status”. It has called on Congo to 
cancel the permit.46
Soco “denies that their operations in the park 
are illegal and states that it is committed to 
abiding by international and national law”.47 
When faced with the allegations of illegality,  
it said that “the only planned activity continues 
to be the scientific studies… No drilling has been 
planned or is warranted at this stage.”48 But the 
work programme in Soco’s Production Sharing 
Contract contradicts this, committing the 
company to drilling two exploration wells.49
In a meeting on 29 May 2014 with Global 
Witness (before Soco’s joint announcement with 
WWF) a spokesperson for the company said 
that after interpreting the seismic data – which 
would not be completed until October 2014 at 
the earliest – the terms of the contract allow 
the company to pull out for commercial reasons: 
“That is our safety net.”
The government of the UK, where Soco 
is headquartered, has said it “opposes oil 
exploration within Virunga National Park” and 
has urged “the Government of DR Congo to fully 
respect the international conventions to which 
it is a signatory”.50 The Belgian, German and 
European parliaments have all passed resolutions 
critical of oil exploration in the park.51 
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CHARACTERS
Soco and its subcontractors
• Ed Story – Soco’s Texan CEO, he started the 
company in 1991
• Roger Cagle – Soco’s co-founder and Deputy 
CEO, based in London
• Rui de Sousa – Chairman of Soco since 2006, 
he also owns a stake in the Virunga project
• Patrick Maugein – an oil trader and Soco 
Chairman from 1999 until his death in 2006
• Serge Lescaut – Soco’s Africa director based  
in Pointe-Noire, Congo Brazzaville 
• José Sangwa – head of Soco’s Congo office, 
based in Kinshasa
• Julien Lechenault – Soco’s Field Operations 
Supervisor in eastern Congo, who left the 
company in September 2013
• Pieter Wright – one of Soco’s security 
contractors working for Specialised Security 
Consultants (SSC)
• “John” – as yet unidentified consultant  
who worked for Soco, filmed undercover by 
Mélanie Gouby
The freelance journalist
• Mélanie Gouby – a French freelance journalist 
who secretly filmed Soco employees
Soco’s friends
• Célestin Vunabandi – MP for an area of eastern 
Congo covering much of Soco’s oil block and now 
a minister. He worked as a consultant for Soco 
• Major Burimbi Feruzi – an intelligence officer 
and Soco’s point-man in the Congolese army. 
• Guy Mbayma – Soco’s point-man in the 
Congolese national parks authority (the ICCN) 
until his recent dismissal 
• The Mwami (Chief) Ndeze - the powerful local 
chief of Bwisha, a wide area including Soco’s 
base camp at the lakeside village of Nyakakoma 
• Kamari Birahira – a top aide to the Mwami 
Ndeze in Nyakakoma
Congo’s environment officials and Virunga rangers
• José Endundo - Congo’s environment minister 
from 2007 to 2012
• Cosma Wilungula - General Manager of the 
Congolese national park’s authority (ICCN), 
which manages sites including Virunga 
• Emmanuel de Merode – Virunga’s chief warden 
since 2008. A Belgian conservationist who 
survived an attempted assassination in April 2014
• Rodrigue Katembo – chief warden of Virunga’s 
central sector
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Katembo - who features in the film Virunga - put 
on a concealed microphone and a button-hole 
camera, gathering information that was submitted 
to North Kivu’s public prosecutor in April 2014. 
At the May 2013 meeting Feruzi offered Katembo 
money to spy on de Merode, saying that he was 
looking for “an accomplice on the inside”. 
“We are trying to gauge Emmanuel [de Merode’s] 
position. Is he plotting behind our backs or is he 
planning an ambush?” said Feruzi. “While we are 
working together, you might hear something and 
you should inform us.”54
“This means we are buying you,” said Feruzi, 
laughing. “After buying you, you accept to 
collaborate with us; and then they will be in the 
position to give you whatever you are asking for.”55
When the subject of money comes up, Katembo 
asked, “Then you are saying I could ask for…”,  
but Feruzi interrupts him: “three thousand 
[dollars]”.56 By western standards this may not be 
much of a bribe but for a Congolese park ranger  
it’s a year-and-a-half’s wages – they earn just  
$165 per month.57
Feruzi wanted Katembo to meet Soco’s security 
contractors, Specialised Security Consultants (SSC). 
“They are the ones who design all the plans and tell 
Soco everything… I myself work with them”.58 
In July 2013 the meeting took place. In more 
undercover video footage, Feruzi can be seen 
introducing Katembo to a white South African: 
“Mr Pieter Wright. He’s my boss. He is a security 
adviser in the company Soco”, the Major said. The 
three men discussed finding reliable rangers to 
collaborate with Soco in the park and at the end of 
the meeting Katembo was handed an envelope with 
$50: “just to say thank you”, Pieter Wright said.59
“’Bribes’ to park rangers have never been nor will 
ever be sanctioned by Soco,” the company has said.60
In a written statement published on 24 April 
2014 Soco denied “any knowledge of the security 
contractor filmed making a payment and does not 
in any way condone his actions”.61 However, in a 
meeting with Global Witness on 29 May a Soco 
spokesperson said, “We think we know who he is”. 
1. ILLICIT PAYMENTS 
AND OFFERS OF BRIBES: 
OVERCOMING RESISTANCE 
OF VIRUNGA PARK 
RANGERS 
 
Four powerful local figures have advanced Soco’s 
interests in Virunga. 
The army major – Feed us information secretly  
and you could get $3,000
The first was Major Burimbi Feruzi, a Congolese 
army intelligence officer assigned to Soco as a 
“Military Liaison Officer”.52 Undercover recordings 
show that he tried to smooth Soco’s way into the 
park through bribery and he referred to a Soco 
security contractor as his “boss”.
Feruzi was first filmed undercover in May 2013 
by senior park ranger Rodrigue Katembo, whose 
authority covered Nyakakoma, the town housing 
Soco’s base camp. Two-and-a-half years earlier the 
provincial High Court of North Kivu had mandated 









“This means we are buying you”: Soco’s point-man in Congo’s 
army offered bribes to a senior ranger
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The park official – Work with Soco and get “money, 
money, money” or be fired
The second official lobbying for Soco was Guy 
Mbayma, until recently the Technical and Scientific 
Director63 at the national parks authority and Soco’s 
official “focal point” with the organisation.64 
In March 2012 he was filmed speaking to Virunga’s 
rangers lined up in formation. 
In a speech that wove together French, Swahili and 
Lingala, one of Congo’s national languages, he said 
that rangers who worked on the “inside team” with 
the company “will get money, money, money, are 
you gonna refuse that?”65 
“When a girl will see you with money, don’t you 
think she will love you? … [And] your kids will be 
able to go to school, that’s true. And then people 
will start praising you and calling you ‘tonton’ 
[uncle]”.66
If the rangers objected to oil exploration in the 
park, Mbayma told them, “you will be fired, I will 
sign your dismissal right this minute”. 67 
An official from SSC’s sister company Demining 
Enterprises International, contacted by phone by 
Global Witness, said that Wright was key to Soco’s 
security arrangements , sharing his job with Soco’s 
main security adviser in eastern Congo, Pieter 
Kock.62 Bossie Boshoff, Operations Manager at DEI 
said: “Pieter Kock is operations manager in Block 5. 
He works back-to-back with Pieter Wright - they 
have the same job. One does two weeks then the 
other does two weeks.”
Soco has acknowledged Major Feruzi is the 
company’s Military Liaison Officer – their point-man 
in the Congolese army. However, it did not answer 
questions about Feruzi in an email from Global 
Witness sent on 27 May 2014, including “Has Major 
Feruzi offered to pay people on behalf of Soco?” 
Speaking about the secret footage showing Feruzi’s 
attempt at bribing Katembo, Soco’s spokesperson said 
that “the evidence that has come out of the film has 
shocked us”, adding that an investigation is underway 
which would result in a “bigger answer” from the 
company and unspecified action. “He hasn’t received 
money from us,” the spokesperson said. “We wouldn’t 
allow that and the books haven’t revealed that he has.”
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benefits – if any” Soco gave to him, directly or 
indirectly. 
The head of Soco’s office in Congo, José Sangwa, said 
that the ICCN’s “Technical and Scientific Director” 
(clearly referring to Mbayma) has “worked a lot” to 
improve relations between the two organisations. 
“He [Mbayma] manages all the rangers, all the people 
there [Virunga Park]. He has an impact when he goes 
to the field. He gives instructions, he guides,” Sangwa 
told Gouby in Kinshasa in November 2013.69
The regional MP – a Soco lobbyist
The third of Soco’s powerful friends was Célestin 
Vunabandi, member of parliament for an area 
that includes Nyakakoma and, since April 2012, 
Congo’s Minister of Planning and Oversight for the 
Implementation of the Revolution of Modernity.70 
He says he acted as a consultant to Soco for over a 
year while he was an MP, and received money from 
them on a monthly basis to allow him to travel 
around the region promoting the oil project. He 
spoke in favour of Soco at public meetings, in the 
media71 and in meetings with NGOs and regional 
politicians.72
Mbayma had funds to back up his promises. His 
boss, Cosma Wilungula, told Global Witness that 
Soco paid money directly to Mbayma, rather than 
to the ICCN centrally, after the company signed its 
May 2011 agreement with the parks authority. The 
work on the ground “was all coordinated by Guy 
Mbayma,” Wilungula said, “I don’t know how much 
Soco gave him”. 
De Merode said that several rangers did receive 
money from Soco. 
“I was made aware that some of my staff had received 
financial benefits in 2011 to 2014 from the said 
company, but this was done without my consent. Nor 
was I ever informed of the functions that they were 
asked to fulfil In return for these payments,” he said.
Mbayma has also threatened local NGOs who 
oppose oil drilling. In an open letter in October 
2013, he claimed that such NGOs may “perhaps 
create new armed groups” and called for the 
Minister of Planning, Céléstin Vunabandi, to put 
together a list of approved groups.68
Soco did not answer Global Witness’s questions 
about Mbayma, including “What payments and 
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Soco paid Célestin Vunabandi – an MP for an area in Block 5 – every month as a “consultant”
Vunabandi told Gouby in a covertly filmed interview 
in December 2013 that he did not sign a contract 
as the company believed that this may not be legal 
under British law. He said: “I remember when we 
discussed with the Soco people at the time, we 
came to the conclusion that, I believe, British law 
does not allow for such a contract to be signed 
with politicians… especially when it relates to the 
promotion of a project”.73
“Of course, every time I was going somewhere… 
they had to compensate me and I was engaged 
every month, it’s true,” he said. 74
Despite the sensitivities around his work for the 
company, Vunabandi says in his LinkedIn profile 
that he worked as a consultant to Soco, with the 
role of “facilitation and support in implementing 
the oil exploration project in [Soco’s] Block 5” for 
Soco from July 2010 to August 2011.75
In Gouby’s recording, Vunabandi tells her that  
his role was to get the local population to accept  
oil exploration in Virunga, using his relationships 
with community leaders and local authorities.  
“I have very good relations with politicians of all 
communities. Soco people have certainly counted 
on that asset,” he said.76
Soco has also kept the MP sweet by employing his 
brother, Damas Vunabandi, as a protocol officer.77
Three sources from North Kivu told Global Witness 
that Vunabandi was the first person to hold public 
meetings about plans for oil exploration in Virunga, 
and that he did not reveal that he was a consultant 
for Soco. “He said that he was there [to speak 
to us] because he is an MP and cared about the 
population,” one of the sources told Global Witness 
on condition of anonymity. It would be “serious” if 
Vunabandi had been paid by Soco, the source said, 
as it would mean that he was acting as “judge and 
jury at the same time”. 
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had been a friend of Soco’s Africa head Serge Lescaut 
since 2005. The MP has also praised Soco at a public 
meeting in the presence of Lescaut, Soco chairman 
Rui de Sousa and Congo office head José Sangwa, 
held the same month that his consultancy started. 
At the event in western Congo, reportedly attended 
by more than 2,000 people, he said: “I am pleased to 
say that this company will be in North Kivu soon – 
more precisely on Block 5. We will be very happy to 
welcome them and aid them in their work.” 79 
The UK Bribery Act makes it a crime for British 
companies to bribe or offer a bribe to a foreign 
public official. It is also a crime for a firm to fail to 
prevent bribery on its behalf (see box: UK, US and 
Congolese bribery laws). The law says that bribery is 
taken to occur when an official is rewarded for the 
“improper performance” of his function, defined by 
the UK’s justice ministry as acting in breach of good 
faith or a position of trust.
The justice ministry’s guidance on the Bribery Act 
says that reasonable expenses and some wining 
and dining are most unlikely to constitute bribery. 
However, if this slips into over-generous treatment 
the line into illegality could be crossed. “The higher 
the expenditure… the greater the inference that 
it is intended to influence the official”, the justice 
ministry says. 
Soco’s relationship with Vunabandi needs to be 
investigated – by Soco itself and, as Global Witness 
is urging, by British and US authorities. His role 
with Soco appears to have been a serious conflict of 
interest at the very least. Vunabandi did not disclose 
his consultancy with the company in meetings with 
local communities and activists.78 At worst, Soco’s 
arrangement with him could have constituted 
bribery – particularly if payments to Vunabandi went 
beyond the reimbursement of expenses and if he 
went beyond his official remit as a public offical. The 
UK Bribery Act came into force in July 2011, towards 
the end of Vunabandi’s consultancy with Soco.
After the consultancy ended, Vunabandi’s name 
continued to come up. A Soco official, discussing a 
phoney demonstration funded by the company, said 
Vunabandi helped arrange it (see section below: The 
spontaneous demonstration). A middleman offering 
bribes to the park ranger Rodrigue Katembo said 
in a recorded meeting that he had been told 
to make the approach by Vunabandi. Both the 
demonstration and the attempted bribery occurred 
during the time that Vunabandi was a minister.
The arrangement with Vunabandi raises questions 
not just about Soco’s regional staff and contractors, 
but also about how executives and senior staff 
understood his role. Vunabandi told Gouby that he 
UK, US AND CONGOLESE  
BRIBERY LAWS
The UK Bribery Act, which came into force in 
July 2011, makes it a crime for British companies 
or persons to bribe or offer to bribe a foreign 
public official anywhere in the world. The Act also 
makes it a crime for a company to fail to prevent 
bribery on its behalf by an “employee, agent or 
subsidiary” of the company. In some cases, senior 
company officials can be held personally liable.87 
If bribery is proven to have occurred, a company 
could defend itself by claiming to have had 
“adequate procedures” in place to prevent an 
associated person from committing bribery.
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act passed in 
1977 likewise makes bribery of foreign officials 
by American businesses or citizens a crime. 
Like the UK Bribery Act it extends to bribery by 
third party agents.88 A company’s management 
can be held responsible for “wilful blindness” 
or purposely not informing themselves of 
suspected wrongdoing.89
Although Soco is based in London, its three 
executive directors - Ed Story, Roger Cagle and 
Cynthia Cagle - are American citizens.90 Ed Story 
and Roger Cagle are both employed through a 
“wholly owned subsidiary” company registered in 
Delaware.91 They thus come under the scope of 
US corruption law.
Congo’s 2005 anti-corruption law makes it a 
crime to, “offer or give directly or indirectly to 
a public official” a sum of money in order to 
obtain favourable treatment.92
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Birahira took part in a Soco helicopter flight to 
Nyakakoma in July 2013 to choose the site of the 
company’s base camp along with Pieter Kock from 
Soco security contractors SSC, and Major Feruzi.86
The “spontaneous” demonstration – Soco pays 
villagers to hold a rally
Soco used its financial clout, handing cash to 
local organisations to give the impression that oil 
exploration had popular support.
In late March 2012 activists and traditional chiefs 
gathered in the town of Vitshumbi, alongside Lake 
Edward, to hold a meeting on Soco’s plans, ending 
it by signing a petition saying they “condemn any 
exploration and… any production of oil in the 
middle of Virunga”.93 Soco organised a rally eight 
days later in the same town, featuring live music 
and a banner reading: “Soco for the development  
of our Lake Edward fishing community”.
In a hut at the end of the day, video footage shows 
Soco agents giving 40 local organisations envelopes 
of money. They told them, “pick up your envelope, 
other things will come later … Don’t say oh, Soco 
sent money or such things, do we agree?”94
In a conversation recorded undercover by Gouby 
three months after the demonstration, Soco’s Field 
Operations Supervisor in eastern Congo, Julien 
Lechenault, acknowledged that Soco had paid for 
the demonstration. Lechenault, a geologist and 
French citizen who worked for the company for 
three years, said: “money was made available to do 
the opposite, an anti-demonstration. Completely 
stupid but we did it”. He then “transferred the 
videos to Kinshasa”, presumably for the news. Asked 
by Gouby how he organised the demonstration, 
Lechenault said: “In fact, via Vunabandi, who is the 
minister. He’s our friend. He knows everyone. Just 
need to send cash and it’s done”.95
In separate, undercover filming by Gouby in 
June 2013, Vunabandi said: “There have been 
demonstrations that took place, sometimes 
organised by Soco”.96
Soco did not answer questions from Global Witness 
on whether it “ever financed public demonstrations 
in Congo”, including in Vitshumbi in April 2012.
Soco did not reply to questions e-mailed by Global 
Witness in May 2014 on its relationship with 
Vunabandi, including “What payments and benefits 
– if any – have Soco, directly or indirectly, given 
to Vunabandi?” However, asked again about this in 
a meeting that month, a Soco spokesperson said: 
“we don’t allow any sort of political donations or 
political endorsement. If something has happened 
that breaches our code we will investigate”. Soco 
says it has not breached the UK Bribery Act.
The village chief and his aides – carrying out 
Soco’s dirty work?
The fourth key ally of Soco was a regional traditional 
chief for an area that includes Nyakakoma. The 
Mwami (Chief) Ndeze has stood alongside Soco 
officials in meetings aimed at winning over the 
support of local communities along Lake Edward.80 
Katembo met with one of the Mwami’s key aides – 
Kamari Birahira, who wields considerable power in 
Nyakakoma as the Mwami’s number two there and 
his chief tax collector. 81 Katembo made undercover 
recordings of meetings in June 2012 and July 
2013, during which Birahira offered him bribes to 
cooperate with Soco. There is no evidence that this 
was authorised by Soco.
Birahira told Katembo that the ranger was “the 
lock” to access Virunga and that the two of them 
should collaborate “to make good profits from 
Soco”. National parks officials giving permission 
to Soco to enter the park “must be paid”, he said. 
“There is money that will be paid… to the ICCN and 
it is a large amount.”82
“You get your cut and maybe you give me a little  
of what they give you.”83
Birahira said he was acting under the instructions of 
the Mwami and of Vunabandi, the MP. Vunabandi 
suggested the approach to Katembo in the first 
place, Birahira said, and the Mwami would later 
follow up the matter with Vunabandi.84 
Both the Mwami Ndeze and Birahira were well 
known to Soco. Soco’s operations supervisor in 
eastern Congo was recorded by Gouby in 2012 
saying that the Mwami is a “very important person” 
and a “good friend”, and had promised to provide 
people to accompany Soco on a helicopter flight.85 
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agitating against Soco, was released the same day, 
after pressure from local activists.
Soco issued a statement denying “any knowledge 
or involvement in the alleged claims” regarding 
the arrest and said it intended to investigate 
thoroughly.98 The investigation resulted in a 
statement from an environmental contractor to 
the company saying he was with Feruzi all day on 
16 July and could not see “how the Major would 
have had time to arrest… someone in the few 
minutes that we were separated”.99 The statement 
is unconvincing, not least because of its basic error 
with the date, referring to 16 July when the arrest 
was actually a day earlier.
In another incident, an activist with a local human 
rights group was arrested in September 2013 by 
local navy officials for allegedly taking photographs 
of Soco’s camp in Nyakakoma, according to a 
statement by a local NGO.100 As with the fisherman, 
he was released after an outcry from rights groups. 
The activist was arrested again in February 2014 
after having asked a question deemed to be critical 
of Soco at a public meeting organised by the 
Mwami Ndeze, the traditional chief, according to 
a local source. He had to report to the Congolese 
2. ARRESTS, VIOLENCE 
AND INTIMIDATION
 
Where bribery and illicit payments have failed to win 
over the company’s opponents, Soco’s supporters 
have resorted to intimidation and violence to silence 
them. Several of Soco’s opponents – activists, 
fishermen and Virunga rangers – have been arrested, 
beaten and received death threats. 
Three names come up repeatedly as being linked to 
these arrests and intimidation, all of whom have 
been secretly filmed offering bribes and are closely 
associated with Soco: Major Feruzi, Guy Mbayma 
and Kamari Birahira. Most of the incidents took 
place in Nyakakoma.
A member of a fishermen’s committee in 
Nyakakoma was arrested on 15 July 2013 shortly 
before he was due to speak about the impact of oil 
production in western Congo – on the other side of 
the country and Congo’s only area now producing 
crude.97 The soldier who came to arrest him said 
that he was acting on the orders of Major Feruzi, 
according to two witnesses. The fisherman, who 
was accused by his captors of being a rebel and 
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Despite the strong evidence against him, Feruzi 
continued to act as Soco’s agent. For example, he 
again attempted to recruit Katembo to work for 
Soco in August 2013, according to undercover 
footage taken by Katembo.104 
In another incident, Gaïus Kowene, a freelance 
journalist for Deutsche Welle, Germany’s 
international broadcaster, was attacked hours after 
he broadcast a critical report on Soco in Virunga in 
October 2013. Six armed men “dressed in military 
uniforms” beat him at his home in Goma and stole 
his laptop before fleeing, according to Congolese 
NGO Journaliste en Danger.108 
While Global Witness does not allege that Soco has 
knowingly commissioned a wave of intimidation 
in the Virunga region, it is calling on Soco to 
thoroughly investigate whether any of its allies 
have been responsible for arrests or violence 
targeting people because of their opposition to oil 
exploration.
Stabbing and beatings of Virunga park rangers
Although Soco claims Congo’s national parks 
authority is on its side, Virunga’s park rangers say 
intelligence agency in a nearby town daily for a 
week after his arrest. They asked him why he spoke 
out against Soco and – as with others who were 
arrested for opposing the company - accused him 
of trying to provoke a revolt and going against the 
wishes of the Congolese president. 
A Congolese environmental group wrote an open 
letter to the regional governor of North Kivu 
province in September 2013 complaining of “the 
sustained campaign of intimidation that is being 
carried out by Soco International and its partner, 
ICCN, in their attempt to silence all those who do 
not support their oil exploration project” in Virunga.
“The situation is such that any entity that dares to 
express doubts regarding this venture exposes itself 
to very real danger.”101
Congolese NGOs singled out Major Feruzi for 
being behind the intimidation in a July 2013 
public statement. Feruzi “has been used by Soco 
International; his military status has been utilised  
to silence anyone who has questions about the  
true impact of the oil project”.102 Congo’s 
constitution forbids the use of military personnel 
for private means.103
DEATH THREATS BY TEXT MESSAGE
Soco says they could have come from its supporters
At least six Congolese activists in Goma and Nyakakoma have received death threats by text message 
from unknown senders. One activist, from a Goma-based environmental group, was sent a text in 2011 
saying he would have problems “as long as you continue talking about Soco”. Another time he was 
told “if you continue to speak about oil, you will see [what will happen]. You should be careful”. 
Three activists fled Goma for several months in 2012 in fear of their lives. At the time, Global 
Witness met with and wrote to Soco, urging them to investigate the threats and tell Congolese 
allies and media that the company is “opposed to any personal threats to activists or others”.105 Soco 
consultant Tim Purcell said that the company had investigated and was satisfied that the messages 
did not come directly from the company.106 
In correspondence with a British parliamentarian, the company said that “Soco does not tolerate 
violence, threats of violence or intimidation”. The company added, however, that it had many 
supporters within Virunga and that “It would not totally surprise us if some of them have used 
(arguably the NGOs’ tactic) of misinforming or intimidating others in support of their hope.”  
The company said that it had spent “time and money” attempting to educate these supporters but 
“it is not within our power to manage their activities”.107
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to join the M23, a Rwanda-backed rebel group 
that took over swathes of eastern Congo before 
its defeat at the end of 2013. Mbayma turned 
up during his questioning, telling him he had 
not shown his superiors sufficient respect, said 
Katembo. Mbayma told Human Rights Watch that 
he had nothing to do with the arrest.
In his cell, Katembo received a further beating at 
the hands of other prisoners. He was held without 
charge111 and only released 17 days later. Even 
after his release, he said, he had to report to the 
intelligence services in Goma daily for 80 days.
When media reports linked Soco to the arrest, the 
company strongly denied any involvement, saying “any 
allegations on this subject are totally unfounded”. The 
Soco press release on the matter did, however, include 
a statement in which Mbayma justified the move on 
the basis that Katembo was opposing instructions 
from the Congolese president.112 
Mbayma also told Congo’s Radio Okapi that 
“Monsieur Rodrigue [Katembo] suspended work 
[carried out on the] instructions of the President 
of the Republic”.113 Katembo was arrested for 
“opposition to the State hierarchy”, said Mbayma. 
Mbayma has continued to attack Katembo since, 
saying in an open letter to the head of the ICCN 
on 9 March 2014 that Katembo was plotting to 
“create trouble” against Soco’s exploration plans and 
had “armed himself to the teeth”, training fishermen 
hostile to the Mwami Ndeze to carry out sabotage 
operations. Saying he feared for his own life, Mbayma 
said he would assign a group of rangers for his 
personal protection and called on Soco to “support 
this option”. He accused de Merode of playing “a 
dangerous game” for supporting Katembo.114
they have suffered violence at the hands of the 
company’s allies, in one case for simply making a 
routine inquiry. Two of the most serious incidents 
occurred at Nyakakoma, inside the park.
On 15 June 2012, a helicopter arrived in 
Nyakakoma, carrying a delegation of Soco 
employees and supporters. When a Virunga ranger 
asked the purpose of their visit, members of the 
naval force guarding the team grabbed him by the 
throat, punched him and stabbed him in the ankle, 
according to a ranger present. 
Soco International said that “we are in no way 
responsible for the reported incident” and that 
the helicopter left about 45 minutes before the 
stabbing.109 The ranger who witnessed the event 
disputes this, saying “white men” in the delegation 
saw the stabbing but left without saying a word.110
In September 2013 Katembo, the park 
ranger, travelled to Nyakakoma and ordered 
a Soco engineer to halt work on installing a 
communications antenna, saying that he did not 
have official permission. Soon, Birahira – the aide 
to the Mwami - turned up with four soldiers. He 
confiscated Katembo’s possessions and told him 
he hoped his “body could be burnt by the local 
population”, according to the ranger.
Katembo, fearing for his safety, took to the road, 
seeking to take refuge in Uganda. Two days later, 
on the evening of 18 September, a group of 
soldiers arrested him at Virunga’s hillside town of 
Kanyaboyonga. 
“They took all my things, they beat me, hitting me 
everywhere,” said Katembo, adding that his brother, 
still at secondary school, and a fellow park ranger 
received similar treatment. They then took Katembo 
to his rangers’ base in the area of Rwindi, where he 
says they slapped him in front of his guards. They 
then “took me all over Rwindi, to show people that 
I’d been arrested, mocking me”.
Along the way, he said, the soldiers passed him 
Major Feruzi on the phone, who told him that he 
would be thrown in jail for opposing Soco. 
At intelligence headquarters in the provincial 
capital Goma, officials accused him of opposing 
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Belgian MP François-Xavier de Donnea, who helps 
to run a fund which supports Virunga, told the 
Belgian daily La Libre Belgique that the report 
submitted by de Merode was “a compromising 
dossier”, adding that the timing of the attack was 
“an extremely troubling coincidence”. He called on 
Britain, which is home to Soco’s headquarters, to 
investigate.121
In response, Soco Chairman Rui de Sousa, told the 
paper that “Soco firmly denies these totally false, 
unfounded and defamatory insinuations”, saying 
that “it had no link whatsoever to the attack that 
Mr de Merode was a victim of, an attack that it 
firmly condemns”.122
Roger Cagle, Soco’s Deputy Chief Executive, 
reiterated Soco’s denial to British paper the Times. 
“There is nothing for us to gain by doing this. The 
better question to ask is, ‘How is the guy able to 
stay down there through the M23 [rebels] killing 
everything in their path?’” he said.123 
Following the shooting of de Merode, threatening 
anonymous text messages to Goma activists 
opposing oil exploration began again. One received 
a message on 20 April 2014 which said, “we are 
everywhere you go with your team. Don’t think 
that if we missed your Director [de Merode] that we 
will also miss you”.124 Another received a message 
the following day, warning against opposing oil 
exploration and saying: “you’ll die for nothing like 
de Merode”.125 In May WWF said unidentified callers 
had also threatened two of its staff in Goma over 
its opposition to oil exploration in Virunga. “One 
caller said, ‘We want his head.’” reported WWF. 126 
Soco has said it “has had nothing to do with the 
death threats or texts to human rights activists” 
(see also box: Death threats by text message). 
On 6 June 2014 the national parks authority issued 
a statement saying that Mbayma “is no longer part of 
the ICCN”. While no reason was given for his dismissal, 
the head of the ICCN, Cosma Wilungula, told Global 
Witness that Mbayma had gone beyond his mandate 
in running a “campaign to promote oil exploration”. 
Human Rights Watch had reported that Mbayma 
made a death threat against Katembo – something 
denied by Mbayma himself.115 Human Rights Watch 
also reported an allegation that Mbayma had paid 
rangers hundreds of dollars to attend local meetings 
aimed at convincing people to support Soco.
The shooting of Emmanuel de Merode
Rangers faced great difficulties in challenging Soco 
but the company’s officials and their allies saw 
the rangers’ boss, de Merode, as the main obstacle. 
Soco’s Julien Lechenault told Gouby, “What we wish 
is that de Merode gets fired. If he leaves, it’s going 
to be OK.”116 A similar sentiment was expressed 
by Kamari Birahira during his initial meeting with 
Katembo. “Now the obstruction hinges on one 
person – de Merode,” he said.117
Lescaut, Soco’s Africa director, told Melanie Gouby 
in an undercover recorded conversation in June 
2013: “We have official permission to enter the park 
and Mr de Merode has always opposed it… My great 
fear is that one day there will be a real accident.” 
When asked to clarify he said: “a real incident, that 
people get killed, things like that”.
“I warned the authorities in Kinshasa several times,” 
he added, pointing out that a Soco contractor had 
been kidnapped two years earlier.118 
Later events showed just how dangerous de Merode’s 
position was. On 15 April 2014 he submitted a 
report on Soco’s activities to the public prosecutor in 
Goma.119 On his way back to his base in Rumangabo 
his car was sprayed with bullets by unknown gunmen 
– two bullets hit him, in the stomach and chest.120 
Given that nothing was stolen, it seems to have been 
an assassination attempt. 
There are a number of interest groups who may 
have had reason to attack de Merode – from those 
pushing for oil exploration to illegal charcoal 
traders and ivory poachers. However, at least one 
observer has pointed to the timing of the shooting 
to indicate a possible connection to the oil dispute.
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Other secretly recorded evidence suggests that 
Soco’s allies have either been paying the FDLR or 
plan to pay them and other groups. Birahira, the 
aide to the Mwami, told Katembo:
“Whether the Mai Mai [local militia groups] or 
the FDLR, if they are still around they will have 
to get something so that they won’t obstruct the 
operations,” he said. Another rebel group, the 
Nyatura, “would also have their share so that they 
don’t cause trouble”.131
Soco has said, in response, that, “none of its 
employees, consultants or security contractors 
have played a part in the contact with rebels or 
payments to them”.132 
Soco said in a letter to Global Witness that “contact 
with rebels is inevitable as part of operating in 
the region, however, at no time has any contact 
between Soco or its security contractors with any 
Congolese rebel groups been instigated by Soco or 
its security contractors.”
“The company does not instigate contact with 
rebels nor are payments made by us to rebels,”  
it added.
3. SOCO AND  
REBEL GROUPS
 
Undercover recordings show that Soco staff turned 
a blind eye to relations between their security 
subcontractors and rebel groups in eastern Congo, 
and that these subcontractors appear to have 
paid rebels in return for safe passage to the park’s 
potential oilfields. It is not specified in the recordings 
which subcontractors are being referred to. 
Large parts of Soco’s Block 5 are under the control 
of rebel groups who finance themselves through 
wildlife poaching and trading minerals and 
charcoal. 
The rebels are one of Soco’s main worries. In 
February 2011, Pieter Kock, one of Soco’s security 
contractors, was kidnapped and held for two days 
by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group linked to Rwanda’s 
1994 genocide. According to Katembo, “it’s from 
that moment that Soco understood that they 
needed to start working with armed groups”.127
Gouby recorded a Soco official and one of the 
company’s contractors - Julien Lechenault, Soco’s 
then operations supervisor in Goma, and “John“, a 
self-described British mercenary – discussing the 
company’s relationship with rebel groups.128
“You’ve got to give them money to be able to travel 
through the area,” said Lechenault. John added: 
“And while you’re paying them and keeping them 
happy, they’ll work with you.”129
As the conversation carried on, Lechenault, grew 
nervous and told John: “Shut up!... Don’t. We have 
a journalist here.” He then tried to distance himself 
from the payments, saying “We don’t talk to these 
people. That’s why we subcontract that shit.”130 
The conversation then became more argumentative.
John: Who’s paying the fucking money? You or 
them?
Lechenault: Sub-contractors









Julien Lechenault, a Soco official in Congo, discussing payments 
to rebels: “We subcontract that shit”
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SHOCKING SOCO
 
There is strong evidence of misbehaviour by Soco and 
its allies. A Soco official has been filmed admitting 
to financing a fake demonstration and appearing to 
acknowledge that subcontractors have been making 
payments to rebels. Soco’s Military Liaison Officer, 
along with its “focal point” in the Congolese wildlife 
authority, have been filmed going out of their way 
to push Soco’s agenda, and telling people they will 
get rich if they cooperate with the company. In one 
case Major Feruzi - the liaison officer who serves in 
Congolese military intelligence and collaborates with 
Soco’s security subcontractors - has been covertly 
filmed offering a senior ranger thousands of dollars 
to spy on the head of Virunga. Soco should try to 
explain why state officials are trying so hard to push 
the company’s agenda, and promising those who 
collaborate riches.
When you consider that Soco has made substantial 
direct payments to its focal point in the national 
A Soco spokesman did, however, confirm to Global 
Witness that Lechenault and John were working 
with the company: “We admit that we did contract 
him,” the spokesperson said of Lechenault, adding 
that John appeared to work for an “organisation 
contracted to provide medical services”.
The prospect of oil money in eastern Congo had also 
attracted the attention of the M23 rebels. Colonel 
Vianney Kazarama, a prominent M23 spokesperson, 
told Gouby in a 2012 interview that “we are asking for 
a percentage. They [Soco] cannot exploit without us.”133
He also said that Vunabandi - the local MP, minister 
and one-time consultant to Soco – asked him to 
counter local opposition to oil drilling.
“There have been people among the population that 
do not like Soco doing its work here,” he said. “It’s 
Vunabandi who asked me to calm those people.”
“I told the people, it’s better to work with Soco than 
with the ICCN.”134
“WHO GIVES A FUCK ABOUT  
A FUCKING MONKEY?”
Soco officials see park for its mineral bounty, 
dismiss its wildlife
Soco’s official line is that it wants to protect 
Virunga’s biodiversity but company officials and 
agents have repeatedly denigrated the park, in 
public and in private.
Roger Cagle, Soco Deputy CEO, told the 
Financial Times in 2011 that most of Soco’s 
block was “burnt-out savannah”.135 Rui de Sousa, 
Soco Chairman and part-owner of its Congolese 
business through an offshore company Quantic 
Limited,136 said in July 2013, that Virunga “has 
been in decline for many years.”137
In private, the statements are more blunt. 
Journalist Mélanie Gouby recorded Soco’s 
operations supervisor in Congo, Julien 
Lechenault, and a Soco security contractor, 
“John”, having a frank conversation about 
Virunga.
“It’s just a fucking mine, this park,” said 
Lechenault.138 “It’s crazy, the money you  
could pull out.”
“Fuck me, it’s a monkey,” chimes in John. “Who 
gives a fuck about a fucking monkey?
Soco said in a statement that Julien and 
John “no longer work for Soco” and that the 
company “will never seek to have operations in 
the mountain gorilla habitat”.139 Soco’s oil rights 
abut the area where the gorillas live.
Soco’s attacks on the park come as politicians 
and the company’s local allies moot the 
declassification of the park. An August 2012 
letter from Congo’s current environment 
minister says that the Congolese government 
may opt for the “partial or total declassification 
of Virunga National Park for oil exploration”.140
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parks authority – according to the head of the 
authority himself - and that a powerful regional MP 
was also receiving money on a monthly basis from 
Soco to lobby on its behalf, the questions become 
more pressing still.
Through its choice of local collaborators Soco 
has created an atmosphere of fear around its 
base in Nyakakoma, making it harder for anyone 
to speak out. Given that Soco is headquartered 
in London, is headed by Americans and owns its 
Congolese business through a company registered 
in the Cayman Islands, the response should be 
international. US and UK authorities should launch 
investigations and the company should pull 
out definitively from Virunga. Soco should also 
commission its own independent inquiry into its 
Congolese operations.
Soco’s anti-bribery code says that “The Board is 
aware that Soco operates in an industry sector 
and in certain countries which are considered to 
be high risk by the standards expected by the UK 
Bribery Act.” Clearly, the evidence shows that the 
company’s systems and procedures were inadequate.
The shooting of de Merode, who was lucky to 
escape with his life, was a wake-up call. Another 
of Virunga’s top wardens, Rodrigue Katembo, had 
his life threatened and was beaten severely after 
daring to stand in Soco’s way. Any investigation 
commissioned by Soco should look into arrests and 
intimidation of people who opposed oil exploration 
in Virunga, in each case considering any evidence of 
links to the company or its allies. 
Soco carried out six weeks of seismic testing 
inside the park from April 2014.141 The deal with 
WWF allowed Soco to complete the tests and give 
the Congolese government data on Virunga’s oil 
potential. Roger Cagle told the Times that the deal 
“forces DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] and 
Unesco to come to some kind of accommodation, as 
has been demonstrated in many other places where 
they have accommodated things in world heritage 
sites by redrawing boundaries and by agreeing to 
certain activities being conducted in certain ways”.142
Drilling is still a threat inside Virunga if Congo 
attempts to declassify the park or change its 
borders, or if Soco sells on its rights to another 
company.
Although Guy Mbayma has been dismissed by the 
ICCN, Major Feruzi was still in Nyakakoma guarding 
Soco’s base in August 2014, according to two 
sources familiar with the matter. 
Back in London, Soco’s Executive Directors – 
including Ed Story and Roger Cagle – were awarded 
the maximum annual bonus of 100% of salary for 
the third year in a row for “exceptional company 
and individual performance”. Story and Cagle’s 
pay in 2013 was $3.4m and $2.6m respectively, 
a rise of over 550% for both men over the past 
decade.143 Cagle was during this time responsible 
for managing the company’s risks, including bribery 
and reputational risks.144 
Soco’s investors – including Aviva, Legal & General 
and the Church of England - should push the 
company to rule out all oil activity within the 
current boundaries of Virunga and to launch a full 
independent investigation of corruption, intimidation 
and payments to rebels linked to the project.
If investors are not satisfied with the answers they 
get from the company, they should follow the 
example of Norway’s pension fund, which sold 
its $33m stake in Soco in 2013, partly because 
of concerns about the company’s operations in 
Virunga.145 
The outcome of the clash over Virunga will set 
the tone for how Congo’s fledgling oil industry 
develops, determining whether it can help lift 
Congo out of dire poverty without trashing its 
natural riches and sparking yet more conflict. 
If Virunga is drilled, Congo’s lesser known parks 
such as Salonga National Park, which covers an area 
larger than Belgium, could be next. Huge areas of 
forest in Congo’s central basin have already been 
subdivided into oil blocks. Soco is eyeing these 
potential riches and says it has applied for a “large 
interior block” in Congo.146 “The whole central basin 
is virgin territory,” Soco’s Africa head Serge Lescaut 
has said,147 “We must explore it.”
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1925 Albert National Park is established by Belgium’s King Albert I.
1960 Congo becomes independent.
1969 The park is renamed Virunga National Park.
1979 Virunga is designated a world heritage site, at the request of the Congolese 
government.
1991 Soco International is formed as a subsidiary of Snyder Oil Corporation, USA.
1994 Rwandan genocide. Over 1.5 million Rwandan refugees flee to eastern Congo, 
including hundreds of thousands into Virunga National Park.
1994 Virunga is classified as a world heritage site in danger by Unesco.
1996 First Congo War begins. Laurent Kabila’s forces occupy northeast Congo, including 
much of Virunga. They go on to take Kinshasa in May 1997 and Kabila becomes 
president, renaming Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo.
May 1997 Soco lists on the London Stock Exchange.
August 1998 Second Congo War begins, claiming millions of victims. It formally ends with the 
establishment of a unity government in 2003.
1999 Patrick Maugein and Rui de Sousa buy a stake in Soco and join the board as chairman 
and non-executive director respectively.
January 2001 Joseph Kabila becomes President of Congo after his father’s assassination.
2003 Shell commits not to explore or pump oil in world heritage sites as does the 
International Council on Mining and Metals
August 2005 Soco signs an agreement for an offshore oil block in Congo-Brazzaville, its first 
acquisition in central Africa. A private company set up by a presidential advisor, who 
as the head of the state oil company oversaw the bidding process for the block, gets a 
10% stake in the block.
October 2005 Soco Chairman Maugein and director de Sousa are named in the official inquiry into 
the Iraqi oil-for-food scandal. Both deny any wrongdoing. The following year Maugein 
dies and is replaced by de Sousa as chairman.
June-July 2007 Seven mountain gorillas are killed in Virunga in a few weeks. Pictures of villagers 
carrying the slain silverback Senkwekwe are published around the world.
December 2007 Soco signs a production sharing contract for Block 5 Albertine Graben, over half of 
which overlaps the Virunga National Park.
August 2008 Emmanuel de Merode, a Belgian conservationist, is nominated Director of Virunga 
National Park.
June 2010 Soco’s production sharing contract for Block 5 is ratified by presidential decree.
July 2010 Regional MP Célestin Vunabandi starts working as a consultant for Soco according to 
his LinkedIn profile. This lasts until August 2011.
December 2010 The provincial High Court of North Kivu mandates a member of park staff to 
investigate allegations of wrongdoing by Soco.
2010 – 2011 About 5,000 tourists visit the park, bringing in over $1 million in 2010 and 2011 
combined.
CHRONOLOGY
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February 2011 The head of the Congolese national parks authority says that a team of Soco officials, 
accompanied by a local MP “forced” their way into the park. Soco denies forced entry.
March 2011 Congo’s environment minister suspends Soco’s oil exploration in Block 5 and rejects 
the company’s environmental assessment as “superficial”.
May 2011 Soco signs an agreement with the ICCN under which the national parks authority 
allows Soco to enter the park. Money is paid directly to Guy Mbayma at the ICCN  
who coordinates on-the-ground activities, according to the ICCN head.
1 July 2011 The UK Bribery Act enters into force.
September 2011 The Congolese environment ministry gives Soco permission to conduct an aerial survey 
in Block 5.
2011 – 2012 Activists in the town of Goma opposing oil exploration receive death threats by text 
message. Three activists flee Goma in fear for several months in 2012.
March 2012 Guy Mbayma, Soco’s “focal point” at the national parks authority is filmed undercover 
telling Virunga rangers that they will be paid “money, money, money” if they support 
oil exploration and will be fired if they don’t.
March 2012 Activists and traditional chiefs gather in Vitshumbi and “condemn any exploration 
and… any production of oil in the middle of Virunga”.
1 April 2012 A pro-oil counter-demonstration is held in Vitshumbi. Afterwards Soco agents hand 
local organisations envelopes saying, “Don’t say oh, Soco sent money”.
4 April 2012 Former rebels mutiny from the Congolese army and begin the M23 rebellion.
15 April 2012 Tourism and gorilla trekking in Virunga is halted due to the conflict.
13 June 2012 Soco’s operations supervisor and a subcontractor are filmed undercover in Goma by 
Mélanie Gouby for a documentary, Virunga. The subcontractor says Soco’s oil operation 
has paid money to rebels. Lechenault responds by saying payments aren’t made 
directly. “That’s why we subcontract that shit,” he says. Soco has denied paying rebels.
15 June 2012 Members of the naval force guarding a Soco team stab a Virunga ranger in the  
ankle, according to a ranger present. Soco says “we are in no way responsible for  
the reported incident”.
July 2012 A study by the International Crisis Group warns that major oil discoveries in eastern 
Congo “would exacerbate deep-rooted conflict dynamics”.
6 July 2012 Unesco’s World Heritage Committee calls on the Congolese government to “revise 
its authorisations and not to grant new authorisations for petroleum and mining 
exploration and exploitation” in Virunga.
20 July 2012 Soco increases its stake in Block 5 to 85%.
September 2012 “The UK opposes oil exploration within Virunga”, says the British Foreign Office.  
It urges Congo to “fully respect” international conventions it has signed.
20 November 2012 M23 capture the regional capital, Goma, and hold it until 2 December.
29 November 2012 The Belgian parliament passes a resolution calling for the cancelling of oil rights in 
Virunga.
13 December 2012 The European Parliament passes a resolution urging the Congolese government to 
prevent damage to Virunga from oil exploration.
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May 2013 Total announces that it will not seek to explore for oil in Virunga in its Block 3.  
In February 2014 Total announces a “no-go” policy on world heritage sites.
May 2013 Major Feruzi, Soco’s military liaison officer, tries to bribe a senior Virunga ranger – 
Rodrigue Katembo - to spy on de Merode, the head of the park. He suggests that the 
ranger meets Soco’s security contractors, SSC.
4 June 2013 German parliament passes a motion expressing concern about possible oil exploration 
in Virunga National Park.
July 2013 Major Feruzi introduces the senior Virunga ranger to Pieter Wright of SSC, describing 
him as “my boss”. The three men discuss finding reliable rangers to collaborate with 
Soco. The ranger is handed an envelope with $50, with Wright saying it is “just to say 
thank you”.
July 2013 Major Feruzi introduces the senior Virunga ranger to Pieter Wright of SSC, describing 
him as “my boss”. The three men discuss finding reliable rangers to collaborate with 
Soco. Wright hands the ranger an envelope with $50: “just to say thank you”.
July 2013 A member of Nyakakoma fishermen’s committee – site of Soco’s base camp - is 
arrested, reportedly on the orders of Major Feruzi, shortly before he was due to speak 
about oil.
September 2013 WWF files a complaint against Soco alleging that the company has “violated multiple 
provisions of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”.148 Soco disputes the 
allegations.
September 2013 An activist with a local human rights group is arrested by navy officials for allegedly 
taking photographs of Soco’s camp in Nyakakoma
September 2013 After opposing the construction of a communications antenna, park ranger Rodrigue 
Katembo is arrested, threatened and beaten by government security forces supportive 
of Soco before being held without charge for 17 days. Soco denied any involvement, 
although its statement quoted its ally Guy Mbayma justifying the arrest.
November 2013 The M23 is defeated in a Congolese army offensive backed by the UN. Heavy fighting 
in and around the park.
February 2014 Virunga reopens to tourists.
15 April 2014 Emmanuel de Merode is shot in an attempted assassination. He had submitted  
a report on Soco’s activities to the public prosecutor in Goma earlier in the day.
17 April 2014 Feature-length documentary Virunga premieres at Tribeca Film Festival in New York, 
featuring undercover footage of Soco employees and supporters in Congo.
April 2014 Threatening text messages are sent to local activists in Goma. One says, “Don’t think 
that if we missed your Director [de Merode] that we will also miss you”.
April 2014 Soco starts six weeks of seismic testing in Lake Edward, inside Virunga.
May 2014 WWF say two of its staff in Goma have received death threats.
11 June 2014 Soco issues a joint statement with WWF. The company says it would cease oil 
operations in Virunga unless Unesco and the Congolese government agree that 
they “are not incompatible with World Heritage status”. WWF withdraws its OECD 
complaint. A Global Witness statement says Soco’s announcement could be a ruse.
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